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A
mAbstract
Greece’s currently planned institutional reforms will help to get the country going with
limited economic growth. With an economy based primarily on tourism, trade, and
agriculture, Greece lacks an established competitive industry and an innovation-friendly
environment, resulting in a low export ratio given the small size of the country and its
long-time EU-membership. Instead, Greece exports only its nation's talent, with low
returns. To become prosperous, the country must better capitalize on its Eurozone
membership and add innovative sectors to its economic structure. Given Greece's
hidden assets, such as the attractiveness of the country, a small number of strong
research centers and an impressive diaspora in research, finance and business, we
envision a Greek “Silicon Valley” and propose a ten point policy plan to achieve that
goal.
JEL codes: L2, L26, O3, O4.
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Regulatory environment1. Introduction
Although Greece is showing initial signs of recovering from its 2008 crash following the
reforms imposed by the troika, its economy continues to suffer. As of the end of the year
2012, Greece’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has declined, cumulatively, by more than
twenty percent, with unemployment exceeding 27 percent in the summer of 2013.
A raft of policy recommendations were identified and debated, all seeking to help
the Greek economy find its way out of the crisis. Institutional reforms, in particular
the liberalization of closed professions, wage reductions, and the privatization of public
industries, are meant to help improve the competitiveness of the Greek economy.
However, the economy will not become prosperous only by cutting costs and making
institutional reforms, as much as these are needed. The central problem is the lack of
an established industry structure and a well-functioning innovation system. If nothing
else changes, the country will have a steady, tourism-based economy supplemented by
a food manufacturing base. These components will not yield substantial prosperity
increases for the Greek society.
At the same time we observe a considerable number of scientists who are able to
conduct cutting edge research in Greece along with a tiny number of high tech indus-
tries. Although embroiled in the current difficulties of administrative provisions, these
firms create highly valuable products in Greece. We also observe that the GreekHerrmann and Kritikos; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
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institutions and high tech companies in the US and across Europe. Moreover, the coun-
try disposes of a unique asset when it comes to win the international race for talents:
the attractiveness of its quality of life.
We argue that Greece is at a crossroads: it can either choose to focus on tourism only,
emulating the example of Orlando, Florida, or to be ambitious and follow the example of
San José, California, by using the same assets that attract tourists to attract talented individ-
uals with unique skills from over the world. Such commitment by Greek authorities will
transform Greece into an innovation-based economy producing technological break-
throughs that create added value in high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries. To
achieve this goal, Greece needs to develop an innovation system by implementing a specific
set of policy measures encompassing, inter alia, (i) the further development of existing and
the establishment of new research institutes, universities and professional education of the
highest quality; (ii) the expansion of research clusters based on existing specialization within
Greece; (iii) business environment reforms including improved (intellectual) property rights,
aimed at nurturing the entry and growth of innovative firms and businesses; (iv) the devel-
opment of financial tools to support actors in the early stage of innovation; and (v) the de-
velopment of a Diaspora policy toward Greek researchers, investors and business owners
living outside of Greece. For many, the vision of Greece as European "Silicon Valley" might
appear as a pipe-dream. As we argue in this paper, such a plan is both desirable and achiev-
able when provided with the political will and perseverance to make it a reality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a short review of the
current economic situation in Greece, making clear why austerity measures and in-
stitutional reforms are necessary but not sufficient. Section 3 describes why focusing
on innovation is a key ingredient for getting Greece on a path toward long-term eco-
nomic growth. Section 4 presents a specific policy plan in how to make Greece more
innovative. Section 5 concludes.
2. Current situation in Greece
Greece – like other economies – faced a severe recession in 2009, which turned in
Greece into a sovereign debt crisis. The Troika of the European Union, the European
Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund came into action with the goal of
preventing Greece from bankruptcy. This Troika monitoring its public deficit negotiated
a list of severe austerity measures and economic and institutional reforms to attain fiscal
consolidation.1 Several austerity measure targets have been achieved and initial successes
reported. The labor cost structure of the Greek economy and its current account balance
were substantially improved. The nominal unit labor costs (Figure 1), which were in 2001
relatively low in Greece, peaking at the beginning of 2010, dropped significantly in 2012
with reforms having reduced wages compared to previous years (Buti and Turrini, 2012).
The current account deficit (Figure 2), which had started to become negative before
the financial crisis, has been cut in size over the last three years and, at the end of 2012,
was close to zero. Similarly, the public deficit was significantly decreased. Currently, in the
first half year of 2013, public revenues (without debt service) exceed public expenditures
by 2.6 Billion Euros (European Commission, 2013).
Beyond these initial reform successes, the current economic situation in Greece is
shown in Figure 3: in 2010, 2011, and 2012 GDP shrank by more than 5 percent. The
Figure 1 Nominal unit labor costs: Greece currently with the lowest labor costs. Source:
Eurostat (2012).
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July 2013, unemployed.2 The best educated people are leaving the country, with other
EU-countries taking advantage of this outward migration and it is observed that these
migrants are often better qualified than their German counterparts.3 The negative
development of the Greek economy in terms of GDP and unemployment resembles a
depression. Still, many experts expect that the Greek economy will start recovering
only by enforcing further institutional reforms, thus unleashing competitive forces and
by doing ‘more of the same’ in terms of economic outcomes. Along this line, the fur-
ther Troika reform program consists of a privatization package and of the opening of
several closed professions and the liberal trades.Figure 2 Current account balance. Source: Eurostat (2012).
Figure 3 Development of GDP and of Unemployment in Greece. Sources: Eurostat (2012), IMF (2013).
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whether institutional reforms alone can transform Greece into a sustainably growing
economy, able to pay back its public debt over a reasonable time frame. Table 1 presents
the share of selected activities of gross value added as a percentage. Comparing these shares
to EU averages and select countries, like Finland, Greece experienced a substantial drop in
the manufacturing industry production share, from 18% to 10%; in Finland, this still
accounts for 18% of the economy. The table also reveals that Greece is relatively specialized
in agriculture and tourism (represented by the ‘catering and hotel industry’ sector), with
both shares far above the EU average.4 There are also – albeit few – IT businesses in Greece
(getting 40% of all R&D investments) that, along with similarly small scale high tech com-
panies in other areas, might be the nucleus for economic expansion, but are currently too
small to develop sufficiently if only institutional reforms are continued.
Taking a closer look at the manufacturing industry, clarifies why Greece is in such deep
trouble. The production of food, beverages and tobacco products is the largest single
piece of Greek manufacturing, covering one third of the already small manufacturing sec-
tor; in the EU these average at 10 percent (Table 2).5 At the other end of the scale, we find
that the production of machinery and electrical equipment each represent about 2 percent
of the entire Greek economy, far below the EU average. The only substantial industrial
manufacturing consists of paper and printing as well as the processing of mineral oil, and

















EU 1.7 14.9 3.1 1.8 1.4
Greece 3.1 10.0 6.8 0.4 0.9
Germany 0.8 20.9 1.6 1.7 1.4
Finland 3.0 18.0 1.7 2.2 1.7
Source: Eurostat (2012), Calculations of DIW Berlin.
Table 2 Structure of gross value added in manufacturing industry 2010 in percentage
Greece EU
Food products; beverages, tobacco products 33.3 13.7
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and leather related products 4.7 4.1
Wood, paper, printing 10.3 7.3
Mineral oil 10.5 1.2
Chemical and chemical products 4.3 6.9
Pharmaceutical products 5.6 4.6
Rubber and plastic products, other non-metallic mineral products 8.0 9.0
Basic metals, fabricated metal products 12.5 14.2
Computer, electronic and optical products 0.6 4.4
Electrical equipment 2.5 5.4
Machinery and equipment 2.0 10.9
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, transport equipment 1.9 9.4
Furniture, jewellery, musical instruments, games and toys; repair 3.8 9.0
Source: Eurostat (2012), Calculations of DIW Berlin.
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the firm size in terms of employees (Table 3). While, for instance, in Finland the major-
ity of individuals work for companies with at least 250 employees, it is the opposite in
Greece. Even in manufacturing nearly 50% work for a firm with 9 or fewer employees,
unable to take advantage of increasing returns to scale.6 Moreover, it is argued that
small countries need – due to the advantages of specialization in few areas - larger export
ratios when compared to larger economies. In this line, the Netherlands have an export
ratio of 70 percent and Finland of more than 40 percent. Greece has only a low share of
tradable goods and services in GDP terms, resulting in a low average export to GDP ratio
of only 22 percent between 2001 and 2010 (Table 4). Recent Eurostat figures indicate at
least an increase to 27 percent. Greece managed to maintain a closed economy, despite
having joined the European Union in 1981, revealing the structural problems underlying
the Greek economy. An economy of its size, fully integrated in the EU, should have
produced much larger export shares over time.
The picture of the Greek economy is completed by information on expenditures in
consumption (Table 4) related to GDP. In Greece, final consumption represents 90 per-
cent of GDP, far above average (Euro-zone average is 77 percent), with excessive public
consumption making clear that the investment level in Greece, in particular for R&D,
is far below most other Euro-zone economies.Table 3 Distribution of labor force in the manufacturing industry depending on firm
size 2007
Enterprises with … employee
1 to 9 10 to 19 20 to 49 50 to 249 250 and more
Greece 46 4 9 20 21
Germany 7 8 7 25 53
Finland 9 6 10 24 51
Source: Eurostat, Calculations of DIW Berlin.
Source: Eurostat (2012), Calculations of DIW Berlin.
Table 4 Information on final consumption, export ratios, product market regulations and












Greece 89.38 22.33 2.3 4.0
Netherland 73.04 70.06 0.9 3.132.20
Germany 76.79 41.63 1.3 4.03.50
Finland 74.32 41.81 1.1 2.83.35
Portugal 85.1 29.38 1.4 3.53.90
Source: Eurostat (2012), OECD (2008), Calculations of DIW Berlin.
Product market regulation: The OECD Indicators of Product Market Regulation (PMR) are a comprehensive and
internationally-comparable set of indicators that measure the degree to which policies promote or inhibit competition in
areas of the product market where competition is viable. The indicators cover formal regulations in the following areas:
state control of business enterprises; legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship; barriers to international trade
and investment.
Barriers to entry in services: sub-indicator of product market regulation, includes professional services: Licensing,
Education requirements and Retail trade: licenses or permits needed to engage in commercial activity, specific regulation
of large outlet, protection of existing firms.
Herrmann and Kritikos IZA Journal of European Labor Studies Page 6 of 232013, 2:14
http://www.izajoels.com/content/2/1/14One reason for the deficits in the economic structure of Greece lies in the highly in-
efficient and corrupt public administration, the target of the further planned institu-
tional reforms. The OECD (2010) provides composite indicators of product market
regulations and of barriers to business entry (see Table 4). Both indicators reflect the
numerous regulations, bureaucratic hurdles and restrictions that Greek entrepreneurs
face. Greece is one of the most regulated economies in the EU (see OECD 2010) and
each decision to enter the market bears a substantial risk of failure because bureaucratic
hurdles can be insurmountable for entrepreneurs.7 In this vein, estimates show that bur-
eaucracy costs about 6.8 percent of GDP in Greece, while the EU average is 3.5 percent
(see Drymiotis 2012) (Figure 4).
This leads to the last crucial issue: Corruption, the other side of the coin of over-
regulation, is part of everyday life, like the bribery of bureaucrats, tax collectors, and
judges. Whenever a decision is needed or an absurdly high penalty could be enforced,
corruption prevails. Greece is considered to be the most corrupt Euro-zone country
(Figure 4). This corruption is not just detrimental to the economy in general, but spe-
cifically to innovation and entrepreneurship. Corruption is one reason why researchers
and innovators stay away or leave. Recent investigations cannot find evidence of
changes in the level of corruption.8
In a nutshell: the analysis makes clear that Greece does not have a cost problem, but
fundamental institutional and structural problems. Cutting costs will make Greece
more competitive, but at a wage level below European standards. If only the doubtlessly
necessary institutional reforms are made, Greece will follow a path of limited growth in
sectors of low added value. Tourism, agriculture and trade are not enough to create
sustainable, growing wealth for the whole country. If Greece is to make growth pro-
gress within the group of Euro-zone countries, it must move beyond institutional re-
forms. As we argue, it needs to focus on policy measures that support an innovation
driven economy in combination with the necessary institutional reforms. As we will
show, there exists a base for such a model.
Figure 4 Innovation performance and corruption. Note: A higher corruption perception index
corresponds to a lower level of corruption in a given country. Source: Innovation Union Scoreboard
(2012), Transparency International (2012).
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3.1. Innovative firms and entrepreneurs as the main drivers of growth
Tourism will remain an important part of Greece’s economy. However, if Greece aims
to create long-term sustainable wealth, it must build additional industries with high
added value. Ample research demonstrates why it is worth developing an innovation
friendly environment with support for innovative firms. Aghion and Howitt (1992), for
instance, focus on such firms and, using an endogenous growth approach with the
Schumpeterian theory of “creative destruction”, find that innovative firms are at the
center of sustainable economic growth. As Baumol and Schilling (2008, p.1), put it
“innovative entrepreneurs do make a substantial difference to a nation’s growth rate,
having introduced many breakthrough innovations”.
From the analysis of innovation chains, we know that an economy needs an upstream
innovation system (Nelson 1993) in order to be able to initiate entrepreneurial activities
on a broader basis with innovative and productive firms. Essentially, an innovation
chain starts with excellent basic research, with flowing transitions to publicly financed
applied research. The research and development activities of private companies yield
stepwise spillovers from ideas to innovative products, which need proof of concept,
market demonstrations and commercialization (Gilbert et al., 2008). Moreover, just
building publicly and privately financed research institutions is not sufficient. On the
one hand, the development of new ideas and innovative activities require, as Nelson
and Wright (1992) emphasize, the exchange and interaction of all players in such an
innovation chain beyond those acting in firms. Further ingredients are social structures
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innovative actions in such an interdependent system (Callon 1991). Freeman (1987, p. 1)
defines these interdependent systems as “networks of institutions in the public and private
sector whose activities and interactions initiate and diffuse new technologies.” On the
other hand, spillovers of new ideas to innovative products coming along with the ventur-
ing of businesses need a regulatory environment that protects ideas and allows an easy
entry of new firms into the market. If these ingredients for innovative actions are mixed
in the right way, the long-term commitment to research and innovation will pay off with
growth, higher incomes and prosperity (Cho and Pucik, 2005; Wong, et al., 2005).
3.2. Ingredients of innovation and an innovation friendly environment
Several factors are required to design the transformation to an innovation-driven
economy. Beyond any institutional settings, an economy needs three kind of talented
people: individuals conducting high class research along the innovation chain, entre-
preneurs endowed with the right traits and skills able to be creative and innovative
while bearing the uncertainty connected with the innovation of new products
(Knight 1921; Caliendo, et al., 2011), and managers able to make the transition of in-
novative prototypes to marketable products.
To attract, train and retain talented people and to give researchers, entrepreneurs
and managers a fitting structure enabling them to make their specific contributions
within the innovation chain, economies need appropriately developed innovation systems
(Nelson 1993). These consist of high quality schools and universities, as well as profes-
sional education systems and excellent research within the public sector. It further needs
a functioning financial sector, informal and formal institutions, non-exploitative networks,
as well as a suitable regulatory environment that facilitates internal markets open to new
products and international competition. We elaborate in this section why these factors
are important for an innovative economy. We will sort them into systemic factors; such as
education, research and development, and institutional factors.
Among the systemic factors, high quality schools, universities and professional education
are an indispensable input factor to attract and train the people necessary for innovation:
researchers, entrepreneurs and managers. A well-developed educational system influences
the innovation capacity by increasing the level of human capital in a country or, more spe-
cifically, the aggregated knowledge, skills, and abilities of the human beings that ultimately
become innovative (Gennaioli et al., 2012). The investment into the education of individ-
uals is, therefore, critical to build an innovation economy (Baumol 2005).
There is no innovation without public and private research (Ames, 1961). Public research
is critical and cannot be substituted with private research (see Mazzucato 2011). Often, pub-
lic research activities are divided between basic research (aiming to increase the understand-
ing of fundamental principles) and applied research (aiming to yield practical benefits or
technical solutions to specific problems with the target of commercial use). These different
research activities along the innovation chain are usually conducted in different kind of re-
search institutions, often connected by translational research that aims to further develop
basic research toward its application. The quantity and quality of such research activities de-
pend on the research and development (R&D) funds available and on the excellence of the
researchers using the funds. The principle of meritocracy is of fundamental importance
for attracting productive researchers into the public sector (Ariu and Squicciarini, 2013).
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researchers in the public domain produces greater returns on public investments.
Also the administrative burden underlying the use of these funds is a factor creating
obstacles (Cullmann et al. 2012).
Given the great variety of research areas, the establishment and development of re-
search institutions should be carefully planned. The clustering of different institutions
to build up a critical mass of talent in the same location allows for more productive re-
search along the lines of the innovation chain (Bettencourt et al., 2007). Spill-overs to
entrepreneurs and spin-offs out of research institutes will also generate innovative
products with a higher probability if high-tech start-ups also locate in the same area.
Examples like Silicon Valley, or recently in Berlin-Adlershof or Tel Aviv, provide role
models of well-functioning clusters. In these clusters, networks are created between
players along the innovation chain, in particular between public researchers and private
entrepreneurs striving for innovation, which are key for an economy aiming for innovative
products. Through interaction and cooperation within a network, innovation processes can
be accelerated (Porter 1998). Given the specialization of each network member, scarce re-
sources can be used more efficiently and may increase the speed and probability of success-
ful innovations. However, as the character of new ideas as subjects of commercial exchange
is peculiar (see Arrow’s (1971, p. 152) information paradox on the difficulty of enforcing the
property rights of ideas), in order to be powerful, such networks need a high level of trust.
For trust to emerge and be sustained, it needs in turn informal institutions that enforce co-
operative and fair behavior. Hence the absence or presence of the right informal institutions
is a decisive factor for the success of networks creating innovations.
If an innovation chain is established by appropriately collocated research institutes
being also well connected through networks, and if entrepreneurs are able to transfer
ideas or prototypes to marketable products, they will need capital. In particular, the
availability of risk bearing financial funds is the next prerequisite for starting innovative
businesses. Even if entrepreneurs try to finance their projects with internal funds, such as
personal wealth or money provided by friends and family, a large number of innovative
start-ups face equity gaps (see Veugelers 2011). Banks, and even more so, venture capitalists
are the most important financial intermediaries providing funds to business start-ups. Due
to their specialization, they allocate funds to small firms most efficiently (Diamond 1991).
The last link in the innovation chain relates to the implementation and commercialization
of new products and services in the country of origin. Translating the outcomes of research
into marketable products produced, implemented and sold in the country where they
were invented, strengthens the positioning of innovators and encourages them to stay
in the country of origin. Commercialization is, thus, the last step that needs realization
and it needs managerial capacities able to handle the challenges of introducing new
products to a market.
However, invention will remain without almost any introduction of new products in
the markets if entrepreneurs face a regulatory environment being adverse to the ventur-
ing of new businesses and the protection of property rights. It is, therefore, a necessary
condition to focus on those institutions that are decisive in determining whether or not
the environment for innovation is friendly, in particular on those institutions that secure
property rights, enforce commercial laws, improve general business climate and further
reduce regulatory burdens.
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portant in shaping a country’s innovativeness. A property right is the right to own
something, thus, a prerequisite to own wealth (Fisher 2007). Therefore granting prop-
erty rights ensures that the corresponding wealth stays with the entrepreneur. Without
property rights the incentives to be entrepreneurial and to create something new do
not exist because there may be no reward for working on it. Lack of protection of ideas will
generally lead to fewer investments in innovation and thereby hinder entrepreneurship
(see Anderson, 2003).
Commercial law is important in supporting entrepreneurship and innovation as well.
Complex regulations make it difficult to understand the legal circumstances for any in-
vestment. An important step, therefore, is the comprehensive codification of legislation.
Moreover, requirements for setting up a business, like buying a license from an existing
license owner and other manifold entry barriers, may discourage individuals from becom-
ing an entrepreneur as well (Kloosterman 2003). Overregulation of commerce prevents
productive entrepreneurship from flourishing because it increases the cost of starting a
business, reduces flexibility and the possibility to act quickly on developing opportunities,
as well as reducing experimentation (Gruenhagen and Berg, 2011). The ability for experi-
mentation is a crucially important component for entrepreneurs. The opportunities
needed for experimentation will be greater in deregulated economies with free market
mechanisms because entrepreneurs can be flexible in their approach and develop new
entrepreneurial activities (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994). Of course, it is as important that
these laws are actually enforced (Levie and Autio, 2011).
The other side of the coin of regulation, the issue of corruption, must also be
addressed. The level of corruption has negative impacts on innovative activities in a
country. Innovation is about new products where success in the markets is uncertain. If
this uncertainty is increased by uncertainty on property rights due to a corrupt law en-
forcement system, the total uncertainty can become prohibitively high. As Audretsch
and Feldman (1996) further put it, corruption may affect the willingness of entrepre-
neurs to trust the surrounding institutions, which are necessary to protect intellectual
property rights, and networks, who jointly work (as mentioned before) on intellectual
property rights creation. Trustful entrepreneurs in such an environment risk losing ac-
cess to the entitled profits of their innovative ideas when opportunistic players take ad-
vantage of their created value added (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). Apart from the issue
of lack of trust and too much uncertainty on property rights, corrupt environments also
impose costs on the innovator, as many innovations are about a “Winner-takes it all
game”. Being the first is crucial to make the return on innovation profitable. In this
“rat race” the loss of time and money (in case the innovator being ready to bribe) invested
into corrupt structures can mean that players lose the race. As innovators are welcomed all
over the world, locations with corrupt administration will fail to attract innovative brains.
Putting together the puzzle, it is crucial for any economy aiming to create a business
climate conducive to entrepreneurship to adjust its institutional system. This means it
must reduce regulatory burdens ensuring the right conditions prevail for an environ-
ment open for innovation, and to invest in the development of its innovation system as
described here. If these steps are done correctly, entrepreneurs are able to transfer new
ideas into marketable products in their home country and not abroad. The problem re-
mains that all systemic and institutional factors need to be in place in order to allow
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more slowly than is possible. This dilemma mirrors literature on “innovation systems,”
referring to the factors limiting the effects of an innovation driven economy.
3.3. Greece’s Way to the future: current environment and hidden assets
Looking at Greece of today, at first glance the preconditions for an innovation economy
appear to be suboptimal, with only small parts of an innovation system being in place.
A comparison, as presented in the EU industrial innovation scoreboard, finds Greece in
20th place out of the EU 27, close to Hungary. This performance is no surprise. Information
on investments in research and development (R&D) - as a first measure of the innovative
efforts in the Greek economy (see Figure 5) - reveals that related to the annual GDP, Greece
spends 0.5 percent on R&D activities (with a focus on the IT sector), less than any other
Eurozone economy and closer to countries like Egypt than to the EU average. In addition,
private R&D investments make up less than 0.2% of GDP. Sweden, at the other end of the
scale, allocates 3 percent of GDP to private R&D. Research networks barely exist in Greece
and collaboration with industry is poor. Moreover, there is no financial basis for funding
innovative investments: As holders of Greek government bonds, banks are currently un-
dercapitalized and venture capital is virtually non-existent. And it is a well-known fact
that Greek private investors, potential sponsors of innovative investments, have parked
their funds outside of Greece or even outside the Euro-zone (Evans-Pritchard 2012). At
the end of the innovation chain, when it comes to abilities of handing launches of new
products, Greece again finds herself at the bottom of rankings on management practice
scores (see Bloom et al., 2012).
The regulatory environment for innovation is in a bad shape as well, most probably also
explaining why private investors stay away from Greece. Greece has an overregulated legal
framework that puts substantial burdens and lengthy procedures on its entrepreneurs and
business owners regarding entry regulations, property registration and obtaining or
extending licenses or permits, as well as reporting duties, as measured by the World Bank
(2012) indicator. In 2010, Greece ranked 109th out of 183 countries, far below any otherFigure 5 R&D expenditures, percentage of GDP. Source: Eurostat (2012).
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(2010, 43) puts it, “the business environment also suffers from obstacles to starting a busi-
ness, the little protection given to investors and the difficulty to access finance”.
Overall this picture does not seem encouraging for the vision of an innovation driven
Greek economy. However, one has to acknowledge initial improvements over the past
year and many of the hidden assets of Greece have been substantially underappreciated
in the analysis of Greece's economic prospects. The first asset is the small number of
mostly basic research institutes that produce considerable research output (see also
Grant et al. 2011). This is substantiated through the number of ERC grants (the most
competitive funding scheme in Europe for outstanding researchers) as a proxy for re-
search excellence. A second hidden asset is that more Greek ERC recipients are work-
ing at institutions outside of Greece, in other European Member States (see Figure 6),
than in Greece. This data omits Greek scientists working at institutions outside the EU.
When comparing Greece with other European countries, Greece is found to be the
only country “exporting” more top scientists to other European countries than it is able
to keep at home; this does not count for the fact that Greece does not readily attract
foreign scientists. However, averaging Greek researchers (in Greece and in Europe) over
the Greek population shows that the ratio of grants to the population is similar to
innovation economies like France, Germany, or Great Britain and better than the ratio
for Spanish researchers (see Table 5). If this “brain power” could be unleashed within
Greece, the country could turn more quickly into an innovation economy.
Third, initial steps toward developing research clusters have been made; for instance
by the Demokritos research institute (see Kanellopoulos 2012). Moreover, there is a
considerable number of small, but innovative companies all over Greece that have de-
veloped new ideas that are on the cusp of being turned into marketable products (see
Tsiros 2011). These firms have remained in Greece despite the adverse innovation
environment.
This brings us to the fourth and final “hidden asset” of Greece: Its attractiveness in
terms of climate and quality of life. In an increasingly global race for the best talents,
life quality outside labs turns into a crucial success factor. Labs, researchers, patentFigure 6 Share of Greek ERC grantees in Greece and abroad 2007–2011. Source: Pascual and Sanchini (2012).











Greece 10.5 24 28 52 5.0
Germany 81.8 250 150 400 4.9
Finland 5,4 35 6 41 7.6
Spain 46.1 100 30 130 2.8
France 65.0 240 50 290 4.5
Italy 60.6 145 100 245 4.0
United
Kingdom
62.5 310 40 350 5.6
Source: European Research Concil (2012): Supporting Top Researchers from Anywhere in the World, http://erc.europa.eu/
statistics-0. Eurostat (2012), Calculations of DIW Berlin.
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heritage cannot. Some outstanding research universities in northern Europe and the
northern US have already experienced the problem of competing against universities in
places of higher quality of life, like California, Australia, Singapore and Israel. Europe
so far does not dispose of a “global attractor” where world-class academic research is
matched by locations with attractive climate and quality of life. In this respect Greece
has a unique comparative advantage to most EU members and could make a significant
contribution to Europe’s collective problem of lacking the combination of places with
internationally competitive employment conditions (Halme et al., 2012) and attractive
life quality. If quality of life is matched with excellent research and public administra-
tion, Greece could become Europe’s global attractor for talents (Figure 7).Figure 7 Ease of doing business 2012. The Figure indicates the rank of select countries in the indicator
of the World Bank. Greece is currently placed at rank 78, Singapore at rank 1. Source: The World Bank
(2012), http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings.
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ments. In their study on “doing business”, the Greece’s indicator rose to 78th in 2013.
Improvements were noted for “protecting investors”, “paying taxes”, “trading across
borders”, and for “resolving insolvency” (see Figure 7). No improvements were so far
reported and positions are still far below average with respect to “starting a business”
(ranked 146th), “registering property” (ranked 150th), and “enforcing contracts” (ranked
78th). The same holds true for corruption. As mentioned in Section 2, according to
Transparency International there are no changes in Greece that have reduced corrupt
activities. An efficient set of commercial laws is, however, crucial to promote entrepre-
neurship and innovation, not only for introducing existing innovations in the Greek
economic fabric, but also with respect to foreign direct investment. International inves-
tors, as one critical indicator for the openness and innovative environment of a country,
may otherwise still shy away from Greece and will allocate their money to other coun-
tries where their investment is better protected (Luthans et al., 2000).
Thus, drawing these arguments together, there is a well-established understanding of
what is required at the beginning of the innovation chain. However, given the high
regulatory burden and the unfriendly environment toward innovative companies in
Greece, there are only a scattered number of high-tech start-ups and no knowledge
transferring institutions or applied research between the existing basic research insti-
tutes and the later exploitation of their fundamental findings. And instead of networks
between researchers, institutes work rather in an isolated way with the majority of their
top researchers leaving the country.4. Toward a Greek silicon valley
4.1. Innovation or just tourism: the example of Orlando versus San josé
Obviously the Greek leaders and society face a choice of how to turn their assets, in par-
ticular the quality of life, into economic activity: They can either support the tourist indus-
try only, by allowing in fast procedures that unused land is further transformed to new
hotels, or they can use these same assets to lay the groundwork for attracting creative, tal-
ented and ambitious knowledge workers from over the world. The first strategy might earn
additional returns in the short-term, but will have limited long-term impact on the eco-
nomic performance of Greece. The second strategy will need more time to produce returns,
but these returns are more likely to increase over the long run, which if applied ambitiously
could transform Greece into the leading innovation economy in southeast Europe.
Looking at the economic long-term impact of regions that successfully went through
this transformation process might encourage Greek decision makers toward such a
commitment. This may hold despite all insider-outsider problems, which makes the
current system attractive to insiders (see Vassilatos et al., 2012). Although the high
regulatory burden especially protects insiders, we argue that even insiders will benefit
financially under an innovation economy. If we take house prices as a proxy for relative
wealth, one can see that US cities that are innovation centers have real estate prices
well above the US average. An extreme example is San José (Silicon Valley), where me-
dian house prices in 2010 were almost four times the US average (Figure 8).
A closer look at the outcomes exemplifying these two strategies in the US provides














Figure 8 Median Home Prices of various cities in the US. Source: Silicon Valley Information and
Communications Technologies Study (2011), http://www.netvalley.com/silicon_valley_history.htm.
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of Silicon Valley”, hosts some of the world’s best institutions of higher education and
research. The graphical presentation of price development in these two regions shows a
massive difference in wealth between Orlando and San José (Figure 9 and Table 6). The
median of real-estate prices has been much higher in San José than in Orlando over
the last decade. If we compare the price levels at the peak of the real estate boom, we
find the median of property prices in San José is more than twice (669,000 USD) the
median in Orlando (255,000 USD). This differential became more impressive in the
course of the crisis: In the last quarter of 2011 (Figure 9), the median of property prices















Figure 9 Median sales price (all properties) - comparison in the period 2000–2011. Source: National
Association of REALTORS and Trulia.com.
Table 6 Median sales price of existing single-family homes for metropolitan areas
2009 2010 2011 r 2011.I 2011.II 2011.III 2011.IV r 2012.I p
San José -Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 530.0 595.0 570.0 535.0 600.0 587.5 549.0 535.5
Orlando, FL 147.4 134.7 124.9 119.7 125.6 128.3 127.5 124.6
U.S 172.1 173.1 166.2 158.7 169.1 173.0 162.6 158.1
Source: National Association of REALTORS 2012.
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only conveys a rough measure of tourism versus high-tech industry based economies.
However, the dramatic difference in property prices is an indicator that, for a region
blessed by attractiveness in quality of life, investments in outstanding higher education
and in world-class public research, this can be a more effective strategy than the tour-
ist industry alone. Turning to Greece, tourism might provide short-term revenues in
land sales along the tiny slice of land along the coastline, and small long-term reve-
nues in the service industry as real estate is maintained and tourists entertained. Tour-
ism might be the right choice for the Greek islands, but mainland Greece and large
islands, in particular Crete, might be better advised to go for the “San José approach”.
It will have the chance to transform more than the tiny slice of coastline into high
priced land – Athens, as well as other Greek cities and regions, could see real estate
prices soar. At the same time, the San José approach will produce long-term (tax) rev-
enues in terms of well-paid jobs in new industries.4.2. A Ten point policy plan to realize a Greek vision of an innovation Hub
If Greek authorities decide to capitalize their unique asset of land and life quality in the
fashion of San José, they will find their country headed toward economic growth. Other
examples of surprising emergence of new centers of high-tech innovation, like Tel Aviv
and Berlin, should encourage the Greek government to follow this model. On the road
to San José, the Greek government must make critical decisions. A good starting point
is that Greece does not have to build an innovation system from scratch, but can rely
on existing research institutes and entrepreneurs willing to venture innovative firms.
What they need is the gaps in the innovation chain closed; in particular by providing
high quality education and professional training as well as publically funded research in
a few, excellent universities and research centers, with orientation toward applied re-
search. Further, institutions which create networks and clusters, protect (intellectual)
property rights, and streamline bureaucracy will allow Greek entrepreneurs to intro-
duce new marketable products or processes in Greece instead of in other countries.
A significant number of additional reforms need to be implemented in order to create
the necessary research structure and innovation friendly environment. Moreover, these
reforms and policy changes while being in the responsibility of the Greek government,
need to be supported and endorsed by investors, company owners, and Greek citizens.
Based on the components of an innovation chain and the current situation in Greece,
we recommend several policy measures designed to stimulate innovation in Greece. Re-
lated to the systemic and institutional factors described in Section 3.2, and the status
quo of these factors in Greece described in Sections 3.3, the following 10 point policy
plan is recommended:
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research universities of the highest quality: Closing the gaps of the innovation
chain need to be the first aim of the government. Given the specialization of the
existing research institutes and universities, the research capacities need to be
extended with a strong focus on creating spatially bounded knowledge spillover.
Given that such a strategy needs a strong increase of public investments and given
the current state of the Greek national budget, the European Commission provides
in the Research Framework Programme Horizon 2020 two new tools that will help
Greece to attract the top of research excellence: ERA Chairs and “Teaming
excellence” (see Laursen, 2012). With the ERA-chairs-programme, the EU offers a
funding instrument for universities and public research institutes in convergence
regions like Greece designed to attract outstanding researchers from abroad for
longer stays. The larger “teaming excellence” instrument will supply financial
support for the establishment of a branch institute of an excellent research
institution in a transition region. Teams of research institutions, like Cambridge
University, and transition regions, like the city of Thessaloniki, can make a joint
proposal under this framework. This instrument provides Greek regions the
opportunity to leapfrog to the top of Europe’s research performance: With new
Greek research institutes carrying the reputation of meritocracy and excellent
administration of Europe’s research institutions, the country will better attract the
research talents.
Ideally, the competition for ERA chairs and new “teaming for excellence institutes”
is accompanied by a restructuring of the public research system: An evaluation
based on measuring performance in terms of internationally recognized
publications and patents would facilitate the reallocation of unproductive research
groups to academic teaching, leaving the scarce resources to the most productive
researchers. The Structural funds could be used to provide infrastructure to highly
productive researchers. If wisely combined, the Structural funds together with the
two new European programs will enable Greece to create research institutes and
universities of the highest quality.
2. Provide incentives for researchers to stay in Greece: The most important
resources for generating an innovation economy are the researchers working for it.
Well-educated researchers are the driving force behind cutting edge research, new
developments, and innovation. Well-educated Greek researchers currently work at
institutions in the US and across Europe. In order to be able to compete with
research institutions elsewhere in the world, Greek stakeholders must remove the
barriers that discourage Greek researchers from staying home and other
researchers from coming to Greece. Thus, working and research conditions have
to be designed appropriately to stop the brain drain. Attractive conditions contain
three aspects: (a) independent research with the only target of top quality research
output; (b) salaries that compete with similar institutions in Europe; and (c) a low
regulatory burden for starting research in Greece.
3. Expanding research clusters and networks based on existing specialization: Once
the public research system in Greece is put on the track toward excellence, it will
be important to plan the creation of new research institutes in research areas with
a given Greek specialization. Moreover, research shows (see e.g. Ellison and
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spillovers when research institutes, universities and innovative companies are
geographically concentrated. An impressive example of how education and
research can turn into new innovation based economic growth is the recent of
“Berlin Adlershof”. After Berlin became a center of exceptional education (hosting
an “excellence university” and research with about one dozen federal research
institutes of the Fraunhofer, Leibniz and Max Planck societies), the newly
established “Berlin-Adlershof” technology-park became home for 1,000 companies,
including more than 400 high-tech start-ups (for more details see WISTA 2011)
that received seed finance from specially designed public funds. With similar
injections of research and academic input, Greece could also emulate the story of
“Berlin Adlershof”. In this context the Greek government has to rethink the
geographical reallocation of its scattered research institutes. Furthermore, the
technology park infrastructure, built in the past with the help of Structural Funds
from the European Union, should be re-activated. In the presence of outstanding
research and education, basic technology park infrastructure can turn into hubs of
innovation.
4. Risk Capital for Start-ups: Once knowledge spillovers are turned to new products,
it is necessary to close the equity gap of the high-tech start-ups. Access to risk
capital will then be one major requirement for a vibrant entrepreneurial culture in
Greece. Where necessary, standards and regulations for the provision of seed and
equity capital should be adjusted so that venture capital is attracted to Greece, on
the one hand (see Bygrave and Timmons, 1992), while seed capital needs to be
provided from public sources, on the other. Most importantly, venture capital will
be attracted if research centers of excellence are established, research clusters are
developed, and top researchers are attracted.
5. Reform of the education system and strengthening of professional training:
Parallel to the research approach, there is also need for an excellent professional
training system to get ideas and discoveries turned into new products and services
produced in Greece. Currently new ideas cannot easily make it to the market not
just because of the bureaucratic hurdles but also because practical skills are
missing from the Greek labor market. Such skills are not valued in the Greek
society. There is great potential in this area if Greece takes inspiration from the
Swiss system of professional education. The existing technical colleges in Greece
(particularly those run by the OAED, the public employment agency) provide the
basis to build on a public-private-partnership in education that can lead to
significant increases in the quality of professional education at almost zero cost to
the public sector. On top of that, the European Social Funds or the Leonardo da
Vinci Programme could be used to give young people with talent in practical skills
the opportunity to learn cutting edge knowledge in their field of profession abroad.
Furthermore Greece is home to the European Centre for the Development of
Vocational Training providing unique professional training expertise. No other
EU - Member State has such easy access to best practice.
6. Improve regulations for (innovative) enterprises and implement reforms: As of
2012, according to the World Bank (2012) report, regulations are still very high for
new firms in Greece, hindering or imposing substantial cost to both innovators
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business ventures. Administrative efforts for start-up activities need to be
substantially reduced. This should include reducing the number of days needed to
register new businesses, the number of bureaucratic steps involved in this process,
as well as the number of regulations, fees and reporting duties. As a benchmark,
Greece should aim to realize permanent business registration within one day. To
become a fast and efficient public administration, Greece must implement state of
the art e-administration for all businesses, (e.g. registering online new businesses,
tax declaration, each within one hour). Instead of relaxing on its improvement
from the 109th to 78th place, Greece needs to become one of World Bank’s top 20
when it comes to “Ease of doing business”, as a couple of EU-countries recently
succeeded to do. Moreover, all reforms already approved by legislation (mentioned
before) and those reforms that still need to pass parliament will only become
effective once implemented and enforced by courts. To support the necessary
adjustment processes, administrative officials need to be appropriately trained.
7. Codification and simplification of legislation: In a similar vein, conflicting
legislation also creates uncertainty and additional costs for businesses. Codification
means bringing all amendments to a given law, adopted at different times, into one
law. A swift and comprehensive codification of Greek legislation will eliminate
contradictions and simplify administrative legislation. This should include the
reduction and unification of the number of administrative procedures relating to
any single activity (for details see the EU efforts on “better regulation”,
EU-Commission 2009).
8. Further refinement of the Kallikratis–Tax reform: For successful innovation
economies, municipal leaders committed to create an excellent local business
climate (efficient, fast administration, excellent primary and secondary education,
and good health services) are essential as they create "hands on" the right
environment for innovative entrepreneurs. In most successful innovation
economies, municipalities are therefore entitled to a share of the locally produced
tax-income, rewarding their efforts to create an attractive business environment.
Greek municipality leaders are excluded from business revenues produced in their
municipality, reducing thereby their interest in caring for the local business
climate. Greek municipality leaders will transform to active advocates of excellent
business climate when municipalities get a significant share of tax revenues from
business activities in their municipalities (collection of taxes still subject to central
authority). A share in property tax would not be enough as this provides only the
incentive to local politicians to waste land (e.g. for cheap tourism), rather than
taking care for sustainable economic growth at local level. A local occupational or
business tax would instead create the feedback-control for good local business
climate. The second best solution would be a direct share in income tax (not like
currently - getting a share of the central pool income tax according to a fixed
formula). Such reforms of tax-reassignment (while keeping collection of taxes still
to central authorities) would deliver a fundamental change in speed of the
transition of Greece to an innovation based economy.
9. Start-up Grants: With the impending downsizing of the public administration, a
new pool of entrepreneurial talent will be forced to seek their fortunes. To give
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should be rewarded with grants that cover the basic cost of living during the first
six months of start-up. The overall goal of such an instrument is to increase the
survival probability of entrepreneurs when their freshly created businesses are still
vulnerable (for details on how to design start-up grants without creating windfall
profits, see Caliendo and Kritikos, 2010).
10. Diaspora policy: Almost all measures discussed so far aiming to close the
innovation chain gaps can be supported with a target-oriented Diaspora policy.
Currently, the Greek Diaspora, although very strong, is not treated as an asset to
such a policy approach. Beyond the goal of creating a specific labor market policy
for recruiting talented individuals abroad, in order to counteract the brain drain of
researchers and well educated individuals in general, the Diaspora policy should
open interaction and cooperation between those who go abroad and those at
home. This could include options for creating exchange programs for top
researchers turning the brain drain to brain circulation (see Saxenian 2005) in
order to increase knowledge transfers (see Kerr 2008), finance R&D, attract risk
capital (Plaza 2013), increase management capacities, or even for export promotion
of innovative products produced in the homeland toward the Diaspora (see Rauch
and Trindade, 2002). Thus, the goals of Greek innovation policy can be
substantially accelerated if accompanied by a target oriented Diaspora policy.
Moreover, as Saxenian and Sabel (2011, p. 107) point out, “the increased salience
of Diaspora networks to economic development does also lie in their role in the
design and construction of new institutions in their home countries. Over time
they have the potential to create a context that supports self-sustaining growth”.
Given the vested interests at all levels, it will not be easy to implement such a
policy plan. Further, it needs Greeks to change how they view themselves,
developing from the pre-crisis self-image of an economy based on trade, tourism,
and transfers to the vision of an innovative country. However, if Greek authorities
commit themselves to the long-term goal of turning Greece into a European
Silicon Valley, while communicating to the citizens its long-term benefits, reforms
will find political support.5. Conclusion
Greece’s Euro-zone membership may have given the false impression that the economy
might be driven by innovation. The Greek economy is not – it faces not only institu-
tional but also severe structural deficits with a small industrial basis, low export ratio,
small businesses and many closed professions. If decreasing labor costs and further in-
stitutional reforms were to be the only active policy, then Greece’s future would be a
low wage economy with an extended workbench of other innovative economies. Greece
can only become prosperous if it also uses its comparative advantages beyond tourism,
trade and agriculture.
Greece has a foundation of high quality research institutes at the beginning of the
innovation chain, a handful of innovative companies who remained in Greece despite
the high regulatory burden, as well as an impressive Diaspora in research, finance and
business. As outlined in this article, Greek authorities need to make substantial
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and an appropriate Diaspora approach in order to create an innovation policy which
closes the gaps in the innovation chain. By doing so, the number of innovative compan-
ies would substantially increase, thus allowing Greece to find a path towards sustain-
able growth. However, if Greek authorities rest on their laurels of having slightly
improved the institutional surrounding, researchers, businesses and capital will con-
tinue to stay away.
To this end we propose a ten-point policy plan designed to turn Greece into an
innovation-based economy. Clearly the road to Orlando, Florida, (as a metaphor of
investing in tourism only) would be an easier road to drive for the Greek government.
However, the road to Orlando means keeping Greece at the lower end of income in
Europe. Instead the road to San José offers the prospect of a significant increase in in-
come for all Greeks.
Creating the right environment which encourages top Greek and non-Greek re-
searchers to move to Greece, as well as supporting the Greek innovation chain, are crit-
ical to the future success and prosperity of the country. Recognized research with
breakthrough discoveries will inherently attract venture capital. Attracting talent is a
key factor in kick-starting an innovation economy. This will not only increase the num-
ber of jobs and salaries for highly qualified people, it will also provide prosperity to all.
With this in mind, Greek decision makers must make clear that embarking on an
innovation centered policy will not result in an instant improvement in the Greek
economy – indeed it will take one or two decades at the minimum. However, the time
to start is now, as the earlier these reforms are put into practice, the sooner the country
will enter a sustainable economic growth path. And if all hidden assets are properly
used, Greece might even become one of Europe’s innovation leaders.Endnotes
1For further information on the reform process and the development of the public
deficit, see Tsakanikas 2012.
2It should emphasized though that there are reasons to assume that in Greece the share
of people registering at the employment agency is lower than in many other EU-countries.
The most important one is a much higher share of self-employed. Despite this limiting
factor the current unemployment rate appears exceptionally high.
3See Bertoli et al. (2013). For Germany, for instance, this source observes that the in-
flow of Greek migrants almost doubled to more than 30,000 individuals in 2012 when
compared to 2011. In addition, key agencies required to carry out the reform process,
such as the Bank of Greece or the Regulatory Agency for Energy, are losing skilled staff
at a time when their input is critical.
4According to Tsakanikas (2012) tourism contributed to GDP 15 percent in 2010,
sustaining 740,000 jobs.
5The products with the highest turnover in Greece are beverages and milk products,
see Brenke (2012).
6There are several reasons for this firm size culture. To a large extent, small firm size
is the result of an adaptation according to which firms stay small in order to escape a
predatory state and to realize tax avoidance.
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Thomas (2011).
8See the recent report of Transparency International (2012), which ranked Greece as
94th in the world in its 2012 report with no evidence of improvement. For more anec-
dotal evidence, see Heyer (2012).
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